It was crucial to show the Russian people that they are not invulnerable, and expose the Russian war propaganda. It was a strategically clever move, which I myself thought looked like an opportunity before they did it, as Russia apparently were leaving areas seemingly relatively poorly defended, probably because they thought a Ukrainian attack into Russia was unthinkable under the conditions of western support.
Another way it’s a good move IMO, is that for a period of time, a significant part of the war has been on Russian ground, which eases the pressure on Ukrainian land.
Admittedly I thought the effect in Russia would have been bigger, but apparently Russian propaganda is quite effective despite being downright moronic at times.
It’s very arrogant IMO to claim Ukrainian leadership is incompetent and flawed, considering they have managed to hold back a many times bigger force that had prepared for this war for years. And despite that they still hold after almost 3 years now, and it looks like Russia is the more likely to lose.
it has cost highly skilled and well equipped troops
Obviously, but how do you propose to defend against Russia without losses?
Ukraine has done extremely well, way better than anyone could reasonably have expected.
How do you imagine they could have done better? Surrender?
It was crucial to show the Russian people that they are not invulnerable, and expose the Russian war propaganda… Admittedly I thought the effect in Russia would have been bigger, but apparently Russian propaganda is quite effective
That is because you fundamentally misunderstand the relationship average Russians have with their state. Russians know their leadership is corrupt, that Moscow takes the loot and leaves dirt for the provinces, that corruption is rife, and that they are largely on their own. As a nation with conscription, many get their taste of the state either via (the widespread practice) of bribing a doctor/officer to deem you unfit for service, or via the brutal hazing system inside the military - at age 18.
This lesson of entrenched corruption is reinforced again in later life, over and over, until the idea of generals or politicians getting caught with huge dachas or suitcases of money is normalized - expected even.
Why don’t they speak up or rebel? Because political engagement has proven to routinely be either controlled opposition kept impotent by the state, elections are overtly rigged - or like Navalny and many before him, personal involvement in a direct challenge is dangerous to your survival. Or they go Grozny, Bucha, Ossetia, etc on you if your locale tries to breakaway from Russian dominationz
Russia apparently were leaving areas seemingly relatively poorly defended, probably because they thought a Ukrainian attack into Russia was unthinkable under the conditions of western support.
What were Freedom of Russia raids then? What is the “banditry” Putin claimed as a rationale for the renewed offensive in the north in 2023-2024? The border was known as porous and lightly defended, but a Ukrainian counter-invasion was unseen because… it didn’t make sense. Even as a bargaining chip in the inevitable negotiated end, Russia still holds the big cards and they’re sympathetic as the whole of their strategic hand. The Donbas enables the land bridge to Crimea, Crimea gives the Black Sea Fleet an uncontested route in/out of the Sea of Azov, all of which keeps the mineral loot in the Donbas. The Russians have no wiggle room to negotiate territory, and keep their goals intact. And besides, we all saw how Russia honored the Minsk agreement with Ukraine, why negotiate in good faith with a bad actor?
Another way it’s a good move IMO, is that for a period of time, a significant part of the war has been on Russian ground, which eases the pressure on Ukrainian land.
Yeah, how’s that working out chief? The Donbas is still slowly eroding, and those Strykers, Leopards, and Bradleys aren’t coming back. Nor are the well trained soldiers that were sent in the initial Kursk push.
It’s very arrogant IMO to claim Ukrainian leadership is incompetent and flawed
I didn’t, though I recognize the 3rd party political optics of “selling” the war/victory to western backers has curbed their choices, the role of politics on the battlefield has been hobbling. The prolonged defense of Bahkmut is a perfect example - though it may have directly lead to the Wagner coup and Putin further isolating and neutering his generals, that is an unforeseen boon, not a planned outcome. The propaganda/dick measuring of that city was needless for at least the last two months, given that Chasiv Yar is the actual linchpin on terrain and logistical reasons.
considering they have managed to hold back a many times bigger force that had prepared for this war for years. And despite that they still hold after almost 3 years now, and it looks like Russia is the more likely to lose.
Which will be lauded in history, probably for centuries. As they should be, to grow from of the ashes of Yanukovic’s puppet leadership and stand tall was, and is incredible. Zelenskyy gets his deserved flowers but Hostomel doesn’t get enough credit imo, that was where it was really blunted in the first hours.
Obviously, but how do you propose to defend against Russia without losses? Ukraine has done extremely well, way better than anyone could reasonably have expected. How do you imagine they could have done better? Surrender?
Eyyy there it is. Any criticism is defeatism/bad faith.
I’m an internet commenter, not someone read in on US and Ukrainian state secrets. I don’t know if the Kharkiv offensive could have gone far further based on Russian strength or Ukrainian material on hand from allies, but I can see that the rear defenses were neglected after that ground was won because of over optimism. Same in Avdiivka last year, or the other example I gave of political and/or propaganda decisions instead of realism.
Ultimately it’s our fault for not supplying everything, everywhere, all at once, but again - in the early days the US intelligence community felt that the actual use of nukes was a coin flip. Push Putin too hard, too fast and he’ll actually fall back on the trump card.
but a Ukrainian counter-invasion was unseen because… it didn’t make sense.
The counter-invasion makes sense for several reasons: It demonstrably shows how weak russia is, acts as a bargaining chip in potential negotiations, proves russia won’t go nuclear for something even as ‘egregious’ as boots on the ground in the motherland, and it did relieve pressure on other areas of Ukraine’s defence. It would have collapsed other russian fronts had it not been for NK reinforcements being brought in. An argument for NATO boots in Ukraine if ever I’ve heard one.
IMO Kursk is critical to Trump’s reversal on forcing peace immediately. He doesn’t want to appear to support weakness and so won’t be caught standing next to a bully that just had pants pulled down around their ankles.
As for Ukraine not reclaiming territory? That isn’t their strategy. They are fighting defensively to their advantage. This way it maximizes russian losses while minimizing their own. Don’t expect any territory to be liberated unless there is a huge weakness in russian lines that begs to be taken advantage of like with Kharkiv.
The counter-invasion makes sense for several reasons: It demonstrably shows how weak russia is, acts as a bargaining chip in potential negotiations, proves russia won’t go nuclear for something even as ‘egregious’ as boots on the ground in the motherland, and it did relieve pressure on other areas of Ukraine’s defence.
But - was it worth it? To use precious armor and elite units and put them there, to contest a decent amount of territory and replenish the exchange fund with mobliks? Swelling the line of contact and putting yourself on the logistical back foot - no longer able to abuse interior lines while defending a salient encirclement?
It would have collapsed other russian fronts had it not been for NK reinforcements being brought in.
I’m going to call citation needed on this, I never heard anything like that analysis from the sober voices like RUSI. Relieve pressure in the Donbas and force Russian attention sure, but never cause a Kharkiv style collapse.
IMO Kursk is critical to Trump’s reversal on forcing peace immediately. He doesn’t want to appear to support weakness and so won’t be caught standing next to a bully that just had pants pulled down around their ankles.
I buy the vibes argument somewhat - Trump has been all over the map on foreign policy without a discernible through-line, but he also took a reputation beating due to his former stance of capitulation. And he’s not exactly standing tall with unlimited support like Taiwan or Israel gets:
Trump himself had said on the campaign trail that he would get the fighting stopped within 24 hours of taking office, but when asked more recently how soon he could end the conflict said: “I hope to have six months. No, I would think, I hope long before six months.”
Defining a timeline just means Russia has to stretch themselves to be ‘winning’ on the face of things and look to have a strong negotiating position.
Here which is a day newer than RUSI’s last podcast about Kursk (which Ukraine vastly exceeded the guest’s predictions at this point). Supported by this article a month later.
But - was it worth it?
Ukraine thinks so considering they’ve doubled down with a new assault.
Your link is broken/bad copy-paste - it’s the same link for both citations - share plz?
Pravda is the Ukrainian state media. Not to say it’s a 100% unfounded propaganda mouthpiece, but I wouldn’t consider Voice of America or Radio Liberty unbiased and take their word without independent verification. They have a vested interest in spinning reality to make themselves look favorable (which is logical during war) whilst maintaining enough credibility to not be outright dismissed.
I had cautious optimism for the 2023 counteroffensive, but I got hugboxed by my own media bubble. I still think the war is Ukraine’s to win (provided they aren’t abandoned by us) and they play their cards strategically.
There is a limit to how successful Ukraine can be. It was suffering from a shortage of troops to rotate and hold the line prior to its operation in Kursk. Now it has pulled together what was available as an operational reserve and committed it to a new axis. There is a limit to how far this force can push before it overextends, meaning it will need to dig in soon if the Ukrainians are to hold the ground until negotiations. But as soon as the front stops being dynamic, the Russians will dig defences and then bring up artillery, electronic warfare complexes and fresh troops. In the short term, the operation has diverted the weight of Russian air-delivered bombs away from Donbas, but this will be temporary. Russia has enough personnel and equipment to fight both fronts. It is less clear that this is true for Ukraine.
Fixed the links in my previous comment. In the afforementioned RUSI podcast they essentially say the same thing as you say Sept. 4th but also predict withdrawal 2 months later at best. We’re 4 months in and they’ve made a second push (though nowhere near as hard or effective afaic see).
Point is, ~50k troops were pulled from the front line and the artillery imbalance favouring russia reduced to a quarter what it was previous to the counter-invasion. That level of redeployment alone causes disarray and fosters opportunities to take advantage of the confusion which, IMO, explain the high level of losses seen of late. If you look at how the front line moves from Toretsk and northward russian advances come to a halt (while admittedly southward/Prokrovsk is bad the whole time) for over a month before resuming at a pace nowhere near that seen during Bahkmut offensive.
We can armchair general all we want, but Kursk happened and continues to do so. Even with NK reinforcements cracks in russia’s assault are showing and Kursk went a long way to making that happen which makes it a ‘good’ thing not even including the political and morale implications.
Side note regarding UA sourcing bias: I find you can practically modify numbers by 20% and that usually brings them to within those provided by other ‘neutral’ sources, so when UA says 60k russian troops moved 50k is the number I hear in my head. Other than that they are usually reliable and far better than RU sources.
Well I don’t really disagree with anything you write here, but you must be aware that much of what you claim now, is contradictory to the article I criticized in many ways.
It’s very arrogant IMO to claim Ukrainian leadership is incompetent and flawed
I didn’t, though
But this was the very first comment from the article I quoted:
Ukraine’s professional military core eroded, replaced by mobilized teachers, drivers, farmers, and IT workers.
That’s very demeaning of the Ukrtainian army and leadership.
But now you apparently agree the criticism in the article is exaggerated?
So what are we actually disagreeing on?
The article is trash, and you show nothing to contradict that, seems like you just had a knee jerk reaction.
Ukraine’s professional military core eroded, replaced by mobilized teachers, drivers, farmers, and IT workers.
That’s very demeaning of the Ukrtainian army and leadership. But now you apparently agree the criticism in the article is exaggerated?
I mean, it’s not. Stop just looking at the ‘sexy’ units like 3rd Assault or the Davinci Wolves and pay attention to the regular guys in the trenches or manning the somewhat calm areas of the line - like the TDF. Middle aged men who were welders, bus drivers, famers, store clerks, etc wearing 2014 era digicam uniforms often still holding AK-74s, in poorly built fighting positions, with trash everywhere in the open - why? Poor supply and poor leadership. If you’re not fighting you should be sleeping or digging/improving your FP. Well trained and disciplined troops with NCOs on the line would not permit that.
So what are we actually disagreeing on? The article is trash, and you show nothing to contradict that, seems like you just had a knee jerk reaction.
The article (though heavily needing citation throughout) mostly fits with the informal conversation you can hear from the smaller Telegram channels run by actual soldiers, instead of PR arms of the state/brigades; we are tired of ineffective command treating our lives callously to cover their own failures/ineptitude. And that there is no exit from frontline except via death, crippling injury, or reassignment for the lucky.
This line was the kicker for me from the article, and is exactly the kind of blind hope that I initially started this conversation criticizing:
This fed a dangerous optimism about the upcoming counteroffensive – some even predicted it would end the war and push Russian forces out of Crimea.
Reality proved very different. When these ambitious goals proved impossible, the narrative had to change. Leaders started talking about capturing Tokmak instead – a much more modest objective.
This moment marked a turning point in Western support.
Emphasis mine. The meming of invincible Ukraine against fleeing Russians was foolish, overbuilt expectations, and when the 2023 counteroffensive fell on the Surovikin line, Western leaders had a much harder time selling support of the war domestically as an immediately winnable fight, instead of the protracted attritional conflict of industrial, financial, and manpower capacity that it is.
It was crucial to show the Russian people that they are not invulnerable, and expose the Russian war propaganda. It was a strategically clever move, which I myself thought looked like an opportunity before they did it, as Russia apparently were leaving areas seemingly relatively poorly defended, probably because they thought a Ukrainian attack into Russia was unthinkable under the conditions of western support.
Another way it’s a good move IMO, is that for a period of time, a significant part of the war has been on Russian ground, which eases the pressure on Ukrainian land.
Admittedly I thought the effect in Russia would have been bigger, but apparently Russian propaganda is quite effective despite being downright moronic at times.
It’s very arrogant IMO to claim Ukrainian leadership is incompetent and flawed, considering they have managed to hold back a many times bigger force that had prepared for this war for years. And despite that they still hold after almost 3 years now, and it looks like Russia is the more likely to lose.
Obviously, but how do you propose to defend against Russia without losses?
Ukraine has done extremely well, way better than anyone could reasonably have expected.
How do you imagine they could have done better? Surrender?
That is because you fundamentally misunderstand the relationship average Russians have with their state. Russians know their leadership is corrupt, that Moscow takes the loot and leaves dirt for the provinces, that corruption is rife, and that they are largely on their own. As a nation with conscription, many get their taste of the state either via (the widespread practice) of bribing a doctor/officer to deem you unfit for service, or via the brutal hazing system inside the military - at age 18.
This lesson of entrenched corruption is reinforced again in later life, over and over, until the idea of generals or politicians getting caught with huge dachas or suitcases of money is normalized - expected even. Why don’t they speak up or rebel? Because political engagement has proven to routinely be either controlled opposition kept impotent by the state, elections are overtly rigged - or like Navalny and many before him, personal involvement in a direct challenge is dangerous to your survival. Or they go Grozny, Bucha, Ossetia, etc on you if your locale tries to breakaway from Russian dominationz
What were Freedom of Russia raids then? What is the “banditry” Putin claimed as a rationale for the renewed offensive in the north in 2023-2024? The border was known as porous and lightly defended, but a Ukrainian counter-invasion was unseen because… it didn’t make sense. Even as a bargaining chip in the inevitable negotiated end, Russia still holds the big cards and they’re sympathetic as the whole of their strategic hand. The Donbas enables the land bridge to Crimea, Crimea gives the Black Sea Fleet an uncontested route in/out of the Sea of Azov, all of which keeps the mineral loot in the Donbas. The Russians have no wiggle room to negotiate territory, and keep their goals intact. And besides, we all saw how Russia honored the Minsk agreement with Ukraine, why negotiate in good faith with a bad actor?
Yeah, how’s that working out chief? The Donbas is still slowly eroding, and those Strykers, Leopards, and Bradleys aren’t coming back. Nor are the well trained soldiers that were sent in the initial Kursk push.
I didn’t, though I recognize the 3rd party political optics of “selling” the war/victory to western backers has curbed their choices, the role of politics on the battlefield has been hobbling. The prolonged defense of Bahkmut is a perfect example - though it may have directly lead to the Wagner coup and Putin further isolating and neutering his generals, that is an unforeseen boon, not a planned outcome. The propaganda/dick measuring of that city was needless for at least the last two months, given that Chasiv Yar is the actual linchpin on terrain and logistical reasons.
Which will be lauded in history, probably for centuries. As they should be, to grow from of the ashes of Yanukovic’s puppet leadership and stand tall was, and is incredible. Zelenskyy gets his deserved flowers but Hostomel doesn’t get enough credit imo, that was where it was really blunted in the first hours.
Eyyy there it is. Any criticism is defeatism/bad faith.
I’m an internet commenter, not someone read in on US and Ukrainian state secrets. I don’t know if the Kharkiv offensive could have gone far further based on Russian strength or Ukrainian material on hand from allies, but I can see that the rear defenses were neglected after that ground was won because of over optimism. Same in Avdiivka last year, or the other example I gave of political and/or propaganda decisions instead of realism.
Ultimately it’s our fault for not supplying everything, everywhere, all at once, but again - in the early days the US intelligence community felt that the actual use of nukes was a coin flip. Push Putin too hard, too fast and he’ll actually fall back on the trump card.
The counter-invasion makes sense for several reasons: It demonstrably shows how weak russia is, acts as a bargaining chip in potential negotiations, proves russia won’t go nuclear for something even as ‘egregious’ as boots on the ground in the motherland, and it did relieve pressure on other areas of Ukraine’s defence. It would have collapsed other russian fronts had it not been for NK reinforcements being brought in. An argument for NATO boots in Ukraine if ever I’ve heard one.
IMO Kursk is critical to Trump’s reversal on forcing peace immediately. He doesn’t want to appear to support weakness and so won’t be caught standing next to a bully that just had pants pulled down around their ankles.
As for Ukraine not reclaiming territory? That isn’t their strategy. They are fighting defensively to their advantage. This way it maximizes russian losses while minimizing their own. Don’t expect any territory to be liberated unless there is a huge weakness in russian lines that begs to be taken advantage of like with Kharkiv.
But - was it worth it? To use precious armor and elite units and put them there, to contest a decent amount of territory and replenish the exchange fund with mobliks? Swelling the line of contact and putting yourself on the logistical back foot - no longer able to abuse interior lines while defending a salient encirclement?
I’m going to call citation needed on this, I never heard anything like that analysis from the sober voices like RUSI. Relieve pressure in the Donbas and force Russian attention sure, but never cause a Kharkiv style collapse.
I buy the vibes argument somewhat - Trump has been all over the map on foreign policy without a discernible through-line, but he also took a reputation beating due to his former stance of capitulation. And he’s not exactly standing tall with unlimited support like Taiwan or Israel gets:
Defining a timeline just means Russia has to stretch themselves to be ‘winning’ on the face of things and look to have a strong negotiating position.
Here which is a day newer than RUSI’s last podcast about Kursk (which Ukraine vastly exceeded the guest’s predictions at this point). Supported by this article a month later.
Ukraine thinks so considering they’ve doubled down with a new assault.
Genuinely not trying to nit pick but:
I had cautious optimism for the 2023 counteroffensive, but I got hugboxed by my own media bubble. I still think the war is Ukraine’s to win (provided they aren’t abandoned by us) and they play their cards strategically.
In contrast, here’s the RUSI take
Fixed the links in my previous comment. In the afforementioned RUSI podcast they essentially say the same thing as you say Sept. 4th but also predict withdrawal 2 months later at best. We’re 4 months in and they’ve made a second push (though nowhere near as hard or effective afaic see).
Point is, ~50k troops were pulled from the front line and the artillery imbalance favouring russia reduced to a quarter what it was previous to the counter-invasion. That level of redeployment alone causes disarray and fosters opportunities to take advantage of the confusion which, IMO, explain the high level of losses seen of late. If you look at how the front line moves from Toretsk and northward russian advances come to a halt (while admittedly southward/Prokrovsk is bad the whole time) for over a month before resuming at a pace nowhere near that seen during Bahkmut offensive.
We can armchair general all we want, but Kursk happened and continues to do so. Even with NK reinforcements cracks in russia’s assault are showing and Kursk went a long way to making that happen which makes it a ‘good’ thing not even including the political and morale implications.
Side note regarding UA sourcing bias: I find you can practically modify numbers by 20% and that usually brings them to within those provided by other ‘neutral’ sources, so when UA says 60k russian troops moved 50k is the number I hear in my head. Other than that they are usually reliable and far better than RU sources.
Well I don’t really disagree with anything you write here, but you must be aware that much of what you claim now, is contradictory to the article I criticized in many ways.
But this was the very first comment from the article I quoted:
That’s very demeaning of the Ukrtainian army and leadership.
But now you apparently agree the criticism in the article is exaggerated?
So what are we actually disagreeing on?
The article is trash, and you show nothing to contradict that, seems like you just had a knee jerk reaction.
I mean, it’s not. Stop just looking at the ‘sexy’ units like 3rd Assault or the Davinci Wolves and pay attention to the regular guys in the trenches or manning the somewhat calm areas of the line - like the TDF. Middle aged men who were welders, bus drivers, famers, store clerks, etc wearing 2014 era digicam uniforms often still holding AK-74s, in poorly built fighting positions, with trash everywhere in the open - why? Poor supply and poor leadership. If you’re not fighting you should be sleeping or digging/improving your FP. Well trained and disciplined troops with NCOs on the line would not permit that.
The article (though heavily needing citation throughout) mostly fits with the informal conversation you can hear from the smaller Telegram channels run by actual soldiers, instead of PR arms of the state/brigades; we are tired of ineffective command treating our lives callously to cover their own failures/ineptitude. And that there is no exit from frontline except via death, crippling injury, or reassignment for the lucky.
This line was the kicker for me from the article, and is exactly the kind of blind hope that I initially started this conversation criticizing:
Emphasis mine. The meming of invincible Ukraine against fleeing Russians was foolish, overbuilt expectations, and when the 2023 counteroffensive fell on the Surovikin line, Western leaders had a much harder time selling support of the war domestically as an immediately winnable fight, instead of the protracted attritional conflict of industrial, financial, and manpower capacity that it is.
This entire thread has been very informative, thank you for this